May 2011

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On March 28, 2010, Ex-Streamwood police officer James Mandarino tried to curb a car driven by 28-year-old Ronald Bell near Schaumburg Road and East Avenue in Streamwood. Bell didn’t stop his car until he got into his own driveway a few blocks away. And Mandarino was not happy. What happened next was caught on video:

The squad car video depicts a clearly unjustified beating, in which Mandarino gets out of his car with his gun drawn, hits Bell over the head with a metal baton 15 times while Bell cowers on his knees, and tazers Nolan Stalbaum, the passenger.

After this beating, Mandarino charged Bell with resisting arrest, reckless driving, and several traffic infractions. Mandarino charged Stalbaum with resisting. Because how better to justify excessive force than with false charges?

Thankfully, the video surfaced a few days later, and Mandarino was charged with two felonies: official misconduct and aggravated battery. In March of this year, Cook County Circuit Judge Thomas Fecarotta Jr. convicted Mandarino on both counts after a bench trial, reportedly saying: “If a picture speaks a thousand words, the video speaks a million.”

Today, Fecarotta sentenced Mandarino to 30 months of probation and 150 hours of community service.

Chicago Tribune has more coverage here.

The EEOC regulations implementing the ADA Amendments Act went into effect May 24, 2011. I wrote about the regs for the June issue of InsideCounsel magazine. As I discuss in more detail there, the most significant feature of the regs and the ADAAA is the greatly expanded definition of “disabled.” In the past, many ADA claims couldn’t get over the threshold question of whether the plaintiff had a disability under the law — and this includes plaintiffs with serious illnesses, such as cancer that is in remission. The amendments explicitly overturned the Supreme Court decisions in Sutton v. United Airlines (holding that if the effects of a person’s disability can be mitigated with medication or a device, then the person is not disabled) and Toyota v. Williams (holding that standard for whether an impairment is a disability is whether it prevents or restricts performance of tasks “that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives”).

The regs point out that many other ADA cases were wrongly decided, including the following. Just reading down the list shows why the amendments were needed. Courts had really taken the “substantially limited in a major life activity” standard to extremes that stretched common sense.

  • U.S. v. Happy Time Day Care Center, 6 F.Supp.2d 1073 (W.D.Wisc., 1998) (questioning whether HIV is a disability.)
  • Furnish v. SVI Systems Inc., 270 F.3d 445 (7th Cir., 2001) (finding that cirrhosis of the liver caused by Hepatitis B was not a disability because liver function “is not integral to one’s daily existence.”)
  • Pimental v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, 236 F.Supp.2d 177 (N.D. N.H., 2002) (stage three breast cancer not a disability.)
  • McClure v. General Motors Corp., 75 F. Appx 983 (5th Cir., 2003) (person with muscular dystrophy not disabled because he had successfully adapted how he performed manual tasks so he could work.)
  • Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 297 F.3d 720 (8th Cir., 2002) (diabetes controlled by a careful regimen of diet, exercise and medication not a disability.)
  • McMullin v. Ashcroft, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (D. Wyo., 2004) (individual fired because of clinical depression not protected because of the successful management of the condition with medication for fifteen years.)
  • Eckhaus v. Consol. Rail Corp., 2003 WL 23205042 (D.N.J. Dec. 24, 2003) (hearing impairment not a disability because a hearing aid helped correct that impairment.)
  • Todd v. Academy Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 452 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (seizure disorder not a disability where medication reduced the frequency and intensity of seizures).

The full text of the regs is available here.

In Gillard v. City of Chicago, et al., 11 C 3440, filed today, Carl Gillard, a 40-year-old Chicago resident was driving near 63rd and State when he alleges Chicago police officers Lou Laurenzana and Jenny Molda stopped him for no reason. Although he produced a valid license, registration and proof of insurance, the defendant police officers searched his car, apparently finding drugs (although the complaint is vague on this point). Gillard won the criminal case on a motion to suppress, but spent three months in Cook County Jail in the meantime. Sounds like a hard case to bring to a jury.

Similarly, Coglianese v. Chicago Ridge, et al., 11 C 3419, filed Friday, arises from a traffic stop. In this complaint, the plaintiff alleges that his minor son was a passenger in the back seat of a car driving on Rigeland Avenue in Chicago Ridge when police officer Dropkowski stopped the car, made the kid get out of the car and beat him.

A recent decision from Sangamon County Circuit Judge Patrick Kelley may make it easier for citizens to obtain records reflecting complaints of misconduct against police officers. Kelly held in Christian v. City of Springfield, 2010-MR-000461, that complaints of wrongdoing by police officers are public records subject to disclosure under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act.

Illinois recently amended its FOIA statute to make files related to the “adjudication” of complaints against public employees exempt from disclosure to members of the public who make FOIA requests. Police departments throughout the state have been asserting this statute to try to block access to records of complaints of police misconduct both in response to FOIA requests by interested citizens and in civil lawsuits alleging police misconduct.

In the recent Sangamon County case, Calvin Christian requested internal-affairs files on several Springfield police officers under FOIA. The city refused to produce the documents, citing the language that allows the government to withhold materials relevant to adjudication of disciplinary cases. Judge Kelly ruled that Springfield was reading the statute too broadly. He ordered Springfield to turn over the records generated in the course of the investigation, explaining that the law applies only to those records actually related to disciplinary decisions. Everything up to the adjudicatory decision was fair game.

Hopefully, more judges will take their cues from Kelly when ruling on denials of citizen requests for police records.

Stephen R PattonMayor Emmanuel named Kirkland & Ellis partner Stephen R. Patton as the city’s new corporation counsel. Daley’s corp counsel Mara Georges had been the city’s top attorney since 1999.

Patton hasn’t said much in the media about his new role, but in a Chicago Tribune article today, he hints that he plans to save the city money by bringing more work in-house (that is, to be done by city lawyers rather than outside law firms). It will be interesting to see what Patton and Rahm do with Section 1983 litigation. The city has been quite self-congratulatory about the strategy it implemented over the past two years to outsource most of its representation on civil rights cases to outside firms that take the cases to trial. Without a doubt, the strategy has reduced the number of civil rights cases filed. But it doesn’t seem to be saving the city much money. In 2009, the city spent $58,815,977, total for legal fees, settlements and judgments. In the first quarter of 2011, the city spent $24,129,118, according to data available on George’s website. The outsourcing has created a kind of cottage industry of defense firms that are making millions defending police officers who beat up or falsely arrest people. Some firms will go out of business if the city work dries up. Perhaps Patton will bring the private firm gravy train to an end?

You can read quite a bit about Patton’s illustrious history defending tobacco companies on K&E’s website. Here are some highlights:

  • Defended Miller Manufacturing Co. (a subsidiary of ITW) from antitrust and fraud claims
  • Got Minnesota’s “health impact fee” on cigarette sales overturned for RJ Reynolds
  • Defended Exelon from claims of a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower, the company’s former CFO, who reported alleged accounting fraud

The Supreme Court issued its decision today in Kentucky v. King, 09-1272, ruling that police officers can enter a home without a warrant when they have reason to believe that evidence is being destroyed inside, even if their actions are the reason for the suspected destruction of the evidence.

The case arose from a “buy-bust” operation in Lexington, Kentucky. Undercover cops watched a suspected drug dealer buy cocaine and then head for an apartment building. Officers followed the dealer into a breezeway flanked by entrances to different apartment units, but they lost sight of him. The officers heard a door close and smelled marijuana. They approached the door with the suspicious smells and started banging on the door “as loud as they could” and yelling “police.” Needless to say, the people inside the apartment reacted, and the officers heard unspecified “noises” and people moving stuff around. According to them, they suspected that evidence was being destroyed. So they kicked the door in. Inside they found marijuana and cocaine. The case was before the Supreme Court on review of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s ruling that the drugs should have been suppressed because the entry was illegal. (Coincidentally, the guy they were originally trying to bust was in a different apartment nearby.)

In general, under the Fourth Amendment, the police must have a warrant before entering a home. There are two basic exceptions to this rule: consent of the home’s occupants, or exigent circumstances, such as hot pursuit of a fleeing felon or imminent destruction of evidence.

The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that police may not rely on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement if they “deliber­ately create the exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement” or “if it was reasonably foreseeable that the investigative tactics employed by the police would create the exigent circumstances.” In King, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the search was not justified by the exigent circumstances exception because it was reasonably foreseeable that the occupants of the apartment would destroy evidence in response to the police banging on their door and shouting “police.”

The Supreme Court ruled that it was reasonable for the officers to kick in the door without a warrant because they “did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment,” by banging “as loud as they could” on the door and shouting “police.” (Nevermind the fact that any reasonable human would be likely to interpret this not as a request to come inside, but rather a threat that police entry was imminent.)

Justice Alito, writing for the 8-1 majority, thought that the occupants could have protected their constitutional rights by either remaining quiet inside the apartment (so as not to give the impression that evidence was being destroyed) or by coming to the door and informing the screaming officers that they were not welcome to come inside. The Court wrote, “Occupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional rights but instead elect to attempt to destroy evi­dence have only themselves to blame for the warrantless exigent-circumstances search that may ensue.”

It seems to be a results-based approach to this particular question (i.e. because the occupants had drugs, the Court looked for a way to justify the officers’ conduct). One wonders what the result would have been if the “noises” and shuffling inside had been someone who just got out of the shower (or perhaps a couple involved in an intimate encounter) trying to put clothes on before the police break down the door.

In any event, the decision significantly erodes the “police-created exigency” exception that many lower courts had articulated to prevent police officers from manufacturing an exigency to justify a warrantless entry. See, e.g., United States v. Chambers, 395 F. 3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[F]or a war­rantless search to stand, law enforcement officers must be responding to an unanticipated exigency rather than simply creating the exigency for themselves”); United States v. Gould, 364 F. 3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[A]lthough exigent circumstances may justify a war­rantless probable cause entry into the home, they will not do so if the exigent circumstances were manufactured by the agents”)

Justice Ginsberg wrote a forceful dissent, criticizing the 8-1 majority’s “reduction of the Fourth Amendment’s force.” She wrote:

The Court today arms the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in drug cases. In lieu of presenting their evidence to a neutral magistrate, police officers may now knock, listen, then break the door down, nevermind that they had ample time to obtain a warrant.

The decision is available in PDF format here.

On May 9, 2011, Chicago residents Brian Chandler and Dave Duncan filed a civil rights lawsuit against Chicago police officers Stanley Kus and Vincent Morales. The case arises from a July 22, 2009, incident in which Chandler and Duncan were stopped by the Defendant-Officers. According to the lawsuit, Duncan was driving and Chandler was a passenger in the car, but the Defendant-Officers falsely stated that Chandler was the driver and charged him with driving on a suspended license. The charge against Chandler was dismissed on March 22, 2011.

According to the complaint, Defendant-Officer Kus pointed a loaded gun at the plaintiffs’ heads during the traffic stop. The suit alleges that Morales failed to intervene to stop Kus from using excessive and unreasonable force. The case claims constitutional violations including excessive force, illegal search and seizure, false arrest, malicious prosecution and failure to intervene.

The case is pending before Judge Grady in the Northern District of Illinois in Chicago. The plaintiffs are represented by Richard Dvorak.

On May 10, 2011, Cordell Edmonds and Jesus Poppel filed a Section 1983 lawsuit against two Dolton police officers, Officer Griffin and Officer Coleman, alleging excessive force, false arrest and failure to intervene.

The case arises from a June 20, 2009, incident in which Edmonds and Poppel, who are brothers, were arrested and charged with resisting arrest and battery to a peace officer.  According to the complaint, Edmonds was walking towards his car on Chicago Road in Dolton when Defendant-Officer Griffin approached him and punched him in the face. When Poppel tried to find out why his brother was being beaten, other police officers took Poppel to the ground. Both brothers were charged with battering the officers.

The plaintiffs are represented by the law firm Smith, Johnson & Antholt. The case is pending before Judge Robert W. Gettleman in the Northern District of Illinois.

Darrell Lynn Miller worked for the Illinois Department of Transportation from 2002 to 2007. Miller was assigned to a six-member bridge-maintenance crew that worked out of Dongola, Illinois, at the southern tip of the state.

From the beginning of his employment, Miller was fearful of heights and had trouble performing certain tasks, such as walking on bridge beams. However, Miller was still able to perform many duties, including snow removal and grounds-keeping, repairing and maintaining equipment, spreading gravel and asphalt, directing traffic, and even performing work in a hydraulically lifted “snooper bucket” at heights of up to 80 feet. For most of Miller’s employment, his team accommodated his fear by simply switch tasks with him so he wouldn’t need to perform those duties that triggered his acrophobia. Likewise, other employees accommodated each others’ limitations. For instance, one person with allergies was not required to mow grass or spray bridges.

However, in March 2006, Miller was assigned two tasks that triggered his fear. On March 10, 2006, Miller was directed to nail plywood sheets to the underside of a bridge, a task that required him to go up in a snooper bucket and then unhook his lifeline. Miller completed the job, but filed a grievance claiming that the task was unsafe. Then, on March 23, 2006, Miller was assigned to change light bulbs on a bridge over the Mississippi River, a task which required Miller to climb over the edge of the bridge above the water. Miller had a panic attack and was hospitalized.

IDOT placed Miller on sick leave and ordered him to submit to a fitness-for-duty examination. IDOT’s doctor determined Miller was unfit for duty. Miller filed a grievance and a request for accommodation, which he supported with another evaluation from an independent doctor who found he could perform most of the job’s duties. IDOT denied the request in January 2007, but nonetheless, Miller was ordered back to work in May 2007. On his first day back, he had a dispute with a co-worker. In June, he was terminated for allegedly threatening her.

Miller sued, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois (Stiehl, J.) entered summary judgment for IDOT, finding that Miller’s requested accommodation (shuffling work duties among team members) was unreasonable, that he was incapable of performing the essential functions of his job, and that Miller had not shown that IDOT’s reason for terminating him was a pretext for discrimination.

On May 10, 2011, the Seventh Circuit reversed that decision, finding that Miller had presented sufficient evidence that IDOT regarded him as disabled, that he was able to perform the essential functions of his job, his accommodation request was reasonable, and there were fact disputes about the termination.

“After … Miller was formally diagnosed with acrophobia, IDOT immediately precluded him from performing any task required of the bridge crew, even tasks that could be performed from the ground,” the court wrote. “IDOT forced him on non-occupational disability leave and exaggerated the relatively modest effects of the acrophobia. Even after two psychiatrists cleared him for work without any significant restrictions, IDOT continued to preclude Miller from returning to any and all tasks performed by the bridge crew.” The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded.

The case is: Darrell Lynn Miller v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 09-3143.

Seventh Circuit Judge David F. Hamilton authored the opinion. Judges Posner, Hamilton and Rovner were on the panel. The decision reverses the ruling of Judge William D. Stiehl of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois.